From Guns to Governance: Rethinking Burkina Faso’s Fight against Terrorism

Burkina Faso, long extolled for its reputation as a peaceful and reasonably calm nation in West Africa, is now host to one of the world’s most disastrous terrorist crises. Hitherto described as a “land of upright people” where strong traditions of religious tolerance and social harmony existed, Burkina Faso has recently plunged into violence, anarchy, and humanitarian tragedy. According to the 2024 Global Terrorism Index, Burkina Faso accounted for nearly a quarter of deaths worldwide caused by terrorism in 2023, overtaking countries like Afghanistan and Syria as the world’s most terrorism-affected country. This paper examines the historical context, forces, and development of the crisis, analyzes key actors, evaluates the humanitarian impact, assesses government and international responses, and presents policy recommendations.

Historical Context and Origins of Extremism

Burkina Faso’s current crisis cannot be explained without situating it within the broader instability of the Sahel. Mali was invaded in 2012 by an insurgency led by Tuareg separatists and jihadist groups, which, after NATO intervened in Libya in 2011, expanded across the region. Jihadist groups exploited porous borders and governance weaknesses, gradually building their presence southwards into Burkina Faso.

Blaise Compaoré, former president of Burkina Faso (1987–2014), maintained a fragile stability for nearly three decades, during which he played a key role in mediating crises in the sub-region, thereby keeping the state free from external attacks. Compaoré had turned Burkina Faso into a mediator of regional conflicts. Compaoré reportedly tolerated or negotiated secretly with jihadist groups so that they would not target Burkinabe territory. His sudden ouster from office in 2014 created a power vacuum: the country lacked institutional resilience and a robust security plan. The state’s collapse in rural borderlands, combined with interethnic grudges and abject poverty, created fertile ground for penetration by jihadists.

The first large-scale assault on Ouagadougou in January 2016, when militants bombed the Splendid Hotel and assassinated 30 civilians, signaled Burkina Faso’s introduction into the conflict of the Sahelian jihadists. By 2017, violence had shifted from border areas to the center, particularly the Sahel, Est, and Centre-Nord provinces. Continued political turmoil, including two coups in 2022, further drained the state’s capacity, which left militants further to expand their control over vast rural areas.

Key Militant Groups Operating in Burkina Faso

The Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) broke away from al-Mourabitoun in 2015 and pledged allegiance to ISIS. It is most operative in northern and eastern Burkina Faso. ISGS attacks routinely target military convoys, civilian villages, and local leaders who resist their rule. At least 71 Burkinabe soldiers were killed in an attack in February 2023 when militants ambushed military columns. The militia group has exploited gold mining locations and smuggling routes for financial gain, relying on coercion and intimidation to establish its authority in captured territories.

Founded in 2017 through the merger of the different al-Qaeda franchises in the Sahel region, Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) has followed a twofold strategy: waging war against government soldiers and asserting itself as a substitute dispenser of justice and services where government forces have vacated the area. This “hearts and minds” approach has enabled JNIM to tap into support from marginal populations, particularly in Centre-Nord. Contrary to ISGS, JNIM aims to establish itself within local society, establishing semi-permanent systems of governance.

Founded in 2016 and led by Malam Ibrahim Dicko, Burkina Faso’s first homegrown jihadist group, Ansarul Islam, relies mostly on the Fulani community in Soum province. Ansarul Islam drew on local grievances about land disputes, state neglect, and ethnic prejudice. Despite being weakened after Dicko died in 2017, the group persists, often coordinating operationally with JNIM.

Established in 2020, the Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) are civilian auxiliaries employed and sponsored by the state to reinforce the army. Although they provide manpower, they are under-trained and under-equipped and are vulnerable to jihadist attacks. Worse, Fulani civilian abuses alienated people and radicalized them.

Humanitarian Impact on Civilians

The humanitarian fallout of the conflict in Burkina Faso is staggering and continues to deteriorate at an alarming pace. The human cost of the crisis is staggering.

Displacement: By mid-2023, over 2 million people were internally displaced. Burkina Faso’s displacement crisis is now among the world’s most rapidly expanding. By mid-2024, over 2.1 million people had been displaced, representing nearly 10% of the country’s entire population. The entire population has fled from rural areas under siege by jihadist forces, compelled to pledge allegiance, and terrorized with force for any defiance. Displacement has caused unprecedented stress on host communities, many of which are already riddled with chronic poverty and food deficits.

Food Insecurity and Livelihoods: Over 3.4 million Burkinabè faced acute food insecurity in 2023, according to the World Food Programme. Farm infrastructure gets targeted by armed forces, cattle are stolen, and silos are burned down, taking away livelihoods from the population. Sieges of towns such as Djibo in the north have cut off residents from access to markets, forcing them to turn to costly and risky humanitarian airlifts.

Education: Burkina Faso is now the world’s leading country in terms of school closures through terrorism, with at least 5,478 schools closed, impacting close to 1 million children. Non-state armed groups purposely target education, destroying schools and intimidating teachers, which they link to state power. The result is the production of a generation of uneducated youth, predisposing them to radicalization and recruitment.

Health and Social Services: Health care access has plummeted significantly. OCHA’s 2023 report indicates that more than one-third of health facilities are closed or functioning partially in areas of conflict. Lack of essential medicines, malnutrition, and humanitarian access restrictions have collaborated to raise mortality and morbidity rates. Women and girls are disproportionately affected, and gender-based violence increases in cases of displacement.

Protection and Human Rights: Mass atrocities have also been reported, including mass killings, rape, kidnappings, and child conscription. In 2023, the UN reported more than 1,000 grave child rights violations, including fatalities and forced recruitment into armed groups. Civilians are often caught in the crossfire of jihadist violence and human rights violations at the hands of security forces or militias with little or no access to justice. It is reported that between January and August 2024, conflict-related violence had cost the lives of more than 6,000 civilians.

Government and Military Responses

Burkinabè authorities have failed to manage the growing insecurity. Since 2015, successive governments have pursued a combination of military campaigns, local defense initiatives, and political transitions, but these efforts have yielded limited success.

One major response used by the government is counterinsurgency operations. The state military (Forces Armées Nationales) has conducted operations in collaboration with neighbouring states against strongholds of the jihadists. The armed forces are nonetheless overstretched, under-financed, and regularly reported to be conducting extrajudicial executions and abusive acts against civilians who are suspected of having extremist ties. These abuses do create grievances and inadvertently solidify recruitment into extremist lines.

The VDP, formed in 2020, enlists civilians as auxiliaries to aid the military. In 2023, the state used 50,000 VDPs. Although the VDPs supplement numbers, they are poorly trained, under-equipped, and often find themselves operating outside usual command structures. Their deployment has also further fueled ethnic tensions as many of the VDPs are drawn from non-Fulani communities, with claims of ethnically motivated retaliations against Fulani communities.

As a way to handle the terrorist crisis, the country has been subjected to political instability and coups. Burkina Faso has experienced two coups d’état since January 2022. The military officers have cited civilian leaders’ inability to stem jihadist attacks as their justification for the coups. Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who toppled the government in September 2022, set out to reinstall security and reclaim lost ground. Political instability continues to undermine state legitimacy, erode international alliances, and distract from governance reforms.

Since the regime of Traoré, Burkina Faso has distanced itself from its former colonial power, France, and pursued security partnerships with Russia. There are allegations of cooperation with Wagner Group, although the government denied explicit cooperation. This has raised the alarm over rights abuses and long-term dependence on ambiguous military support.

There has been a level of community engagement efforts in the country. Despite militarized approaches, there have been some attempts by officials to engage with local communities and even clandestine negotiations with armed groups. Such attempts are yet to be coherent and are drowned out by the prevailing military-first policy. Experts contend that unless structural concerns—such as governance, poverty, and ethnic tensions are tackled, military action alone cannot end the crisis.

Regional and International Dimensions

Burkina Faso’s terror crisis also has destabilizing implications for the larger Sahel region. The 2023 breakdown of the G5 Sahel Joint Force and Burkina Faso’s 2024 withdrawal from ECOWAS subverted collective counter-terrorist institutions. Niger later plunged into crisis following its 2023 coup, further complicating regional security collaboration.

The French withdrawal was a turning point, and anti-French sentiments surged in Ouagadougou and elsewhere. Russia also attempted to exert more influence, making the most of the same situation. There is minimal American engagement in terms of intelligence gathering and humanitarian aid today, but it is constantly vigilant on Burkina Faso’s alignment with Moscow.

Humanitarian organizations like the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and NGOs remain operational but with limited access, while some suspend their activities in particular areas due to insecurity and hostility by the government towards external oversight.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Burkina Faso stands at a crossroads. Once a beacon of tolerance, it is now one of the most terrorism-affected countries on the planet. While jihadist groups control vast territories, millions have been forced out, and repeated coup attempts undermine state institutions, the implications for Burkina Faso and the wider region could not be more apocalyptic. The direction the crisis takes will determine the fate of the wider Sahel. Sustainable peace in the country requires more than just security interventions; it also requires inclusive governance, protection of human rights, and investment in long-term human development. Burkina Faso’s people possess a resilience that provides a fragile yet solid foundation from which stability can be rebuilt.

The future of Burkina Faso is bleak unless drastic corrective measures are introduced. Military solutions cannot solely vanquish jihadist organizations; a multidimensional approach is most required to address the terrorism crisis in Burkina Faso. Such measures include:

– Strengthen Governance: International partners should help rebuild local governance, justice systems, and service delivery to restore state legitimacy.

– Human Rights Protections: Establish independent oversight mechanisms over security forces and VDPs and ensure accountability for abuses against civilians.

– Community Dialogue: Facilitate local peace dialogues to reduce intercommunal violence and undercut jihadist recruitment strategies.

– Regional Cooperation: Reinvest in regional security mechanisms under ECOWAS or the African Union to compensate for the collapse of the G5 Sahel.

-Socioeconomic Development: Prioritize investment in education, rural development, and job creation to address structural drivers of radicalization.

– Rebalance External Partnerships: Avoid over-reliance on Wagner or other foreign mercenaries by transparent partnerships with multilateral institutions.